














































University of Adelaide 







Sources of Variations Between The Inflation Rates 














 CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
The Centre was established in 1989 by the Economics Department of the Adelaide University 
to strengthen teaching and research in the field of international economics and closely related 
disciplines. Its specific objectives are: 
 
•  to promote individual and group research by scholars within and outside the Adelaide 
University 
•  to strengthen undergraduate and post-graduate education in this field 
•  to provide shorter training programs in Australia and elsewhere 
•  to conduct seminars, workshops and conferences for academics and for the wider 
community 
•  to publish and promote research results 
•  to provide specialised consulting services 
•  to improve public understanding of international economic issues, especially among 
policy makers and shapers 
 
Both theoretical and empirical, policy-oriented studies are emphasised, with a particular focus 
on developments within, or of relevance to, the Asia-Pacific region. The Centre’s Director is 











School of Economics 
Adelaide University  
SA 5005 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone: (+61 8) 8303 5672 
Facsimile: (+61 8) 8223 1460 
Email: cies@adelaide.edu.au 
 
Most publications can be downloaded from our Home page: http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/ 
 
ISSN 1444-4534 series, electronic publication  





Sources of Variations Between The Inflation Rates of 












Centre for International Economic Studies and  
School of Economics 












a/ Department of Economics, National University of Singapore. E-mail: 
artp9449@nus.edu.sg 
b/ School of Economics, University of Adelaide, Australia (Corresponding Author).  
E-mail: reza.siregar@adelaide.edu.au 
 
Data supports from the Econometrics Study Unit at the National University of 
Singapore are greatly appreciated. Comments/inputs from the participants of the 
2002 Australian Conference of Economists (Adelaide, South Australia: September 30 






Sources of Variations Between The Inflation Rates of Korea, Thailand and 





Despite the large number of studies done on the recent East Asian crisis, hardly any of 
them has however simultaneously evaluated the roots of the inflationary pressures and 
unearthed the sources of sharp variations between the inflation rates of the various 
crisis-effected economies.  To help fill in this gap, our paper examines and contrasts the 
sources of inflation in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea during the period of 1985 to 
2001. A number of potential sources of inflation will be considered in the study. But this 
study pays a particular attention to the possible roles of the monetary aggregates and 
the exchange rate uncertainties in encapsulating the rise in the inflationary pressures 
and the variations between the inflation rates experienced by these economies during 
the 1997 crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
The presence of more severe inflationary pressures has long been considered as 
a consistent feature of global financial crises in 1980s and 1990s.  During the Tequila 
crisis in mid-1990s, Mexico had seen its price levels to increase by around 35 percent 
annually for two consecutive years (in 1995 and 1996 (Table 1)). Similarly, with the 
collapse of the banking sector and the fall of the currency board in Argentina in early 
2002, the domestic price level has risen by around 30 percent within the first six months 
of 2002. It is interesting to also note that both Mexico and Argentina had posted 
remarkably low inflation rates a year before the break of the financial crises. Mexico had 
successfully lowered its inflation rate from 9.7 percent in 1993 to around 6.9 percent in 
1994. Argentina, on the other hand, was experiencing deflationary pressures between 
1999 and 2001. 
Looking at the experience of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand during the last few years of 1990s, the East Asian crisis is no exception (Table 
1). During the peak of the crisis in 1998, the annual inflation rates of these countries 
were at least four to six percentage points higher than their perspective rates in 1996.  
However, unlike the recent crisis in Mexico and Argentina, the rise in the price level of 
the East Asian countries was generally less severe and less comparable. Despite the 
stronger inflationary pressures in Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and South 
Korea, the rates remained at a single digit even at the height of the financial crisis in 
1998. Furthermore, these economies have successfully slashed their inflations rates in 
1999.  
In contrast, Indonesia suffered much more severe inflation rates in 1998 and 
1999. During those two years, the consumer price index had risen to the rates parallel to 
those posted by Mexico and Argentina in 1995 and 2002, respectively. For a country that 
had a long reputation for its commitment to both prudent monetary policy and sound   2
management of the fiscal policy, the inflation rates in 1998 and 1999 were in fact the 
worst that Indonesia had experienced in nearly 30 years. 
What are the underlying “economic explanations” behind the sharp increase in 
the rates of inflation experienced by these major East Asian economies during the 1997 
crisis?  More importantly, how do we account for the substantial disparity between the 
inflation in Indonesia and the rates experienced by Thailand and Korea? Despite large 
studies done on the recent East Asian crisis, limited studies have however 
simultaneously evaluated the roots of the inflationary pressures and unearthed the 
sources of sharp variations between the inflation rates of the various crisis-effected 
economies.
1 To help fill in this gap, our paper examines and contrasts the sources of 
inflation in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea during the period of 1985 to 2001. The 
focus of the paper will largely be on the post-1997 inflation episodes, but the pre-crisis 
observations are also incorporated to further highlight the similarities and differences 
between the pre-and post-crisis experiences within each economy and between them as 
well.  
A number of potential sources of inflation will be considered in the study. But we 
will pay a particular attention to the possible roles of the monetary aggregates and the 
exchange rate uncertainties in encapsulating various issues surrounding the price levels 
of these economies. These two factors have frequently been cited as the roots of the 
stronger inflationary pressures during the early part of the crisis (IMF (2000 and 2002), 
Fane and McLeod (1999), Lane et.al (1999) and Ramakrishnan and Vamvakidis (2002)).  
Major devaluations of the key East Asian currencies helped to produce the worst 
                                                           
1 Lane et.al (1999) had briefly sketched out possible sources of variations between the inflation 
rates of these three economies, but no in-depth empirical works were presented to conclusively 
support their analysis. Studies on the East Asian crisis can also be found in 
(http://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/Asia/index.htm) and 
(http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/). 
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volatilities that these currencies had experienced in the last three decades (Rajan, 
Siregar and Bird (2002)).  Consequently, stabilizing the local currencies and limiting the 
inflationary consequences of the sharp devaluations have been one of the main 
objectives of the Letter of Intent (LOI) signed between the government of these 
economies and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
2.   
The other cornerstone of the Letter of Intent is on the management of key 
monetary aggregates. In late 1997 and early 1998, a number of these economies had 
experienced excessively high growths of base money due to the liquidity supports 
provided to troubled banks and the impact of depositor runs on banks. To contain the 
inflationary implications of the loose monetary policy, the Letter of Intent stipulates, in 
general, the limits on broad money (M2) growth, to be achieved mostly through 
controlling base money (M0) quarterly growths.  
  The outline of the paper is as follows. Next section presents a theoretical 
framework for the empirical model. Section 3 discusses the relevant empirical testing 
and findings. Section 4 highlights the similarities and differences between the relevant 
stylized facts of these economies, particularly during the post-crisis period. Brief 
concluding remarks section end the paper. 
 
2. Working Model 
  Monetarists advocate that the rate of inflation ( t p ∆ ) should equal the growth 
rate of the nominal money supply (∆
S
t m ) minus the growth rate of real money demand 
                                                           
2 Letter of Intent between IMF and the governments of the crisis-effected economies can be 
downloaded from the IMF Web-site (www.imf.org). 











 (Abel and Bernanke (2001), Deme and Fayissa (1995) and Darrat and Arize 
(1990)).    
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t      ( 1 )  
All variables are in the logarithmic forms. ∆ denotes the first difference operation, and t 
captures time. 
  The basic real money demand function can be expressed as the following:  









t =   ) , ( t t r y f      ( 2 )  
That is real money demand is a function of income ( t y ) and prevailing domestic interest 
rate ( t r ).
3  However recent studies have shown that in an open and financially liberalized 
economy, the impacts of external factors in the demand for money are found to be 
significant (Khalid (1999) and Sriram (2001)). To incorporate the external factors, we 
adopt a modified real money demand of Khalid (1999).










t =   ) , , , ( t t t t ed rf r y f      ( 3 )  
where:  ) ( t ed is the expected depreciation rate of the local currency. It is proxied as the 
actual depreciation of the local currency during the last period.
4   ) ( t rf  is the foreign 
interest rate variable. 
  Substituting equation (3) into equation (1) will yield the following general 
expression for domestic inflation: 
                                                           
3  For a good review of money demand, please refer to Chapter 3 of McCallum (1989). 
 
4  ) ( t ed is positive (negative) if there was a depreciation (appreciation) of the local currency last 
period.   5
   ) , , , , (
S
t t t t t t m ed rf r y f p = ∆       ( 4 )  
Equation (4) suggests that the level of domestic inflation is going to be influenced by the 
level of domestic income, domestic and foreign interest rates, expected depreciation of 
the local currency (the exchange rate factor) and domestic money supply. 
  The following first order conditions should hold. 







      ( 5 )  
Given no other changes, a rise in  ) ( t ed lowers money demand. Therefore, there will be a 
relatively higher supply of money than demand for money in the domestic economy. 
Inflation is therefore expected to rise (Equation 1).    







      ( 6 )  
  Similarly, a rise in foreign interest rate  ) ( t rf will lower demand for money in 
domestic economy, as the opportunity cost of holding money increases.  Given 
everything else in the economy remains unchanged, price level is expected to rise. 







      ( 7 )  
  The rise in output / income should increase demand for money (Equation 2). 
Given money supply remains unchanged, the rise in the level of money demand relative 
to money supply will lead to a decline in inflation rate (Equation 1). Hence, a rise in 
output will eventually cause inflation rate to decline.  







                          ( 8 )    6
A rise in the domestic interest rate will increase the opportunity of holding money, 
hence demand for money should fall (Equation 2). With the supply of money unchanged, 
the fall in money demand should increase domestic inflation (Equation 1). 








                 ( 9 )  
Lastly, as clearly indicated by Equation 1, an increase in money supply, given everything 
else remains unchanged, should lead to a higher domestic inflation. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Testing 
3.1. Data 
 
Variable ed represents the expected depreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
of rupiah, baht and won against the US dollar and the nominal effective exchange rates. 
ed at time (t) is represented as the actual change of the bilateral and nominal effective 
exchange rate at time (t-1). A positive ed implies an expected depreciation of the East 
Asian countries against the major global currencies (and vice versa).  
The bilateral nominal exchange rates are adopted from the International 
Financial Statistics, the International Monetary Fund for various years and the Data 
Stream. The nominal effective exchange rate (neer) is a GDP-weighted of seven major 
world economies’ currencies against each of the East Asian currencies.
5 Each weight is 
the ratio of each country’s annual GDP over the total sum of the seven countries’ GDPs. 
The nominal effective exchange rate is the total sum of the bilateral nominal exchange 
rate of each Asian currency against the major world currencies multiplied by the GDP-
weight, respectively. The GDP series and the bilateral nominal exchange rate series are 
                                                           
5  Those major economies are the United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, 
France and Italy.   7
adopted from the International Financial Statistics, the International Monetary Fund for 
various years. 
The base money series (m
s) and the nominal domestic interest rate are gathered 
from the database of Bank Indonesia and Data Stream. For the domestic interest rate 
(r), we adopted the 3 months rate of the Certificate of the Central Bank for Indonesia, 
and the money market rate for both Thailand and Korea. The Certificate of Bank 
Indonesia is from the Data Base of Bank Indonesia, and the money market series are 
from the Data Stream. The nominal foreign interest rate is the US three months deposit 
rate, taken from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. The domestic income 
variable is the real GDP of each country. These series are adopted from the database of 
the Econometrics Study Unit of the National University of Singapore.  Inflation rate is 
calculated as the change in the consumer price index (CPI). The CPI series is sourced 
from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
 
3.2. Unit Root Testing 
To ensure the robustness of the test results, three most commonly used unit-root 
tests, namely the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and KPSS unit 
root tests, are applied on the relevant variables. The unit root test results on the log-
forms of the relevant variables are reported in Tables 2-4. Note here, given the 
availability of the data series, we test output  ) (y  variable based on quarterly 
observations. As for the rest of the variables, we apply the monthly series. We break the 
monthly observation set into pre-and post-crisis periods. By adopting this step, we avoid 
structural breaks on the series associated with the transition from the pre- to post-crisis 
period. For the quarterly data, we focus only on the pre-crisis. The use of monthly or   8
quarterly series should not affect the final outcomes of the tests (Pierse and Snell 
(1995), and Marcellino (1999)).   
The results reveal that the variables such as rate of inflation  ) ( p ∆ , and the 
expected depreciation of the local currency  ) (ed  do not contain unit roots and thus 
stationary processes. But output  ) (y , domestic interest rate  ) (r , foreign interest rate 
) (rf  and the money supply (m0) are found to be an I(1) series (non-stationary 
processes at the level and stationary processes at the first difference).  
---- (Insert Table 2-4) ---- 
 
3.3 Short Run Dynamics 
The main focus of this study is to analyze the role of various key economic 
variables on inflation rate. Given the unit-root test results, it is irrelevant to examine the 
long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables, as the dependent variable is 
stationary. The Autoregressive Distributed lag model (ARDL) has been constructed by 
treating inflation as an endogenous variable. The non-stationary explanatory variables 
are differenced appropriately to remove the unit roots.  Hence our working model, based 
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The expected signs of the coefficient estimates are consistent with Equation 4. a and ε  
are a constant and an error term variable, respectively. We assume that the error term to   9
be a white noise process. ∆ denotes the first difference operation, and all the variables 
are in the log-forms.  
Up to eight lags for the monthly observations and four lags for the quarterly 
observations of the dependent variables are included in the initial estimation, and then 
sequentially we exclude the statistically insignificant lags of the variables.
6 As stated in 
the introduction of the paper, two different regressions are estimated: (1) pre-crisis 
period and (2) post-crisis period. The pre-crisis regressions are done in both quarterly 
and monthly data
7. The model for the post-crisis period is based on monthly data as the 
use of quarterly data for the post-crisis period highly suffers from the lack of degrees of 
freedom. Furthermore, since the output variable is not available in the monthly 
frequencies we omit them from the post-crisis analysis.  
Table 5a – 7b report the overall results. We find the signs of the estimated 
coefficients are in general consistent with the theory discussed in section 2, except for 
the output variable for all pre-crisis cases.
8 The diagnostic statistics, including the R
2 
statistics adjusted for degrees of freedom, the Durbin-Watson (DW), the Ljung-Box Q 
statistics, the F-statistics (and its probability), the Engle’s ARCH test for 
heteroscedasticity and the Jarque-Bera normality test, are presented for each 
regression. The F-statistics indicate that the probability is at least 95 percent that one or 
more of the independent variables are non-zero. The Durbin-Watson statistics and the 
Q-statistics indicate that the serial correlations are not a problem in any of the regression 
results. The ARCH results conclude the absence of heteroscedasticity in general. Lastly, 
                                                           
6  The numbers of lags are chosen to ensure that we have enough degrees of freedom. Our test 
results have shown that no significant results are found beyond the lags that we have imposed.  
 
7  The pre-crisis covers the period of quarter 1, 1987 to quarter 2, 1997, or January 1987 – June 
1997. Availability of data dictates our sample observations. The post-crisis set includes 
observations from July 1997 to December 2001. 
 
8 We still include the output variable in the final regression as the coefficient estimate is found to 
be significant.   10
the Jarque-Bera test statistics confirm the normality of the disturbances. Several key 
findings warrant further analysis. 
---- (Insert Table 5a-7b) ---- 
 
  3.3.1 Indonesia 
For the pre-crisis period, we do not find any of the interest rate variables 
contributes significantly to the changes in the domestic price level. Furthermore, while 
only the quarterly tests show that expected depreciation of rupiah significantly 
determines the inflation rate, both the quarterly and the monthly regressions confirm the 
important contribution of the money supply in explaining fluctuations of the inflation rate. 
Indicating the robustness of the test results, each set of regressions (with bilateral 
nominal exchange rates of rupiah against the US dollar and the nominal effective 
exchange rate) arrives at the same overall conclusion.  The R-squares suggest that the 
explanatory variables can explain around 17 percent to 34 percent of the inflation rates 
in Indonesia for the pre-crisis period.  
In contrast, the R-squares for the post-crisis period are well above 80 percent, 
suggesting a much higher explanatory power of the independent variables in explaining 
the inflation rates. Furthermore, each of the monthly regression results robustly confirms 
the significant roles of expected depreciation of rupiah, money supply and domestic 
interest rate in explaining changes in the inflation rate in the country. Among the 
significant explanatory variables, the test results also suggest that the base money is the 
most significant and persistent contributor to the substantial increase in the overall price 
level in Indonesia during the post-crisis period.  
 
3.3.2 Thailand   11
  All the explanatory variables are found to be significant and have theoretically 
consistent coefficient signs during the pre-crisis period, with the exception of the output 
variable. The test results for quarterly and monthly regressions are consistent for both 
the NEER and the bilateral nominal exchange rate of baht against the US dollar, 
confirming the robustness of the test results in general. The R-squares for the pre-crisis 
ranged between 17 percent to 23 percent for the monthly case, and 49 percent to 54 
percent for the quarterly case. 
  The explanatory power of the model for the post-crisis period has improved, 
suggested by the respectably higher R-square (at 45 percent) for the monthly 
regression.  The exchange rate factor, the base money and the domestic interest rate 
are found to be significant in causing price changes in both regressions of NEER and 
nominal baht against the US dollar. However, the foreign interest rate is significant only 
for the bilateral nominal exchange rate case. Unlike the case for Indonesia, it is less 
obvious as to which of the significant explanatory variables is the most influential factor 
in generating the post-crisis strong inflationary pressure in Thailand.  
   
3.3.3 Korea 
Both quarterly and monthly test results for the NEER and the bilateral nominal 
rate of won against the US dollar have robustly indicated that all explanatory variables 
are significant, with the exception of exchange rate factor. As in the previous cases of 
Indonesia and Thailand, we also find a sharp difference between the R-squares for the 
quarterly observation and the monthly case. 
For the post-crisis, the monthly test results for both NEER and the bilateral won 
against the US dollar suggest that coefficient estimates of all explanatory variables are 
significant and theoretically consistent, except for the foreign interest rate. The R-
squares are at around 62 percent, significantly higher than the pre-crisis monthly R-  12
square (at 11 percent). The results underscore the important roles of the domestic 
factors in devising the inflationary pressures. Based on the number of the significant lags 
of the explanatory variables for both the NEER and the bilateral nominal exchange rate 
regressions, the test results also suggest that the impact of the expected depreciation of 
the local currency is not only the most significant factor but also has an immediate and a 
lasting impact on the post-1997 domestic price levels.     
 
3.3.4 Testing the Implicit Assumption of Exogeneity  
The validity of the econometrics test results posted in the previous tables 
crucially depends on the implicit assumption that the right-hand side variables in 
Equation (13) are statistically exogenous to inflation. To test for the statistical 
exogeneity, we employ the one-sided procedure to test for causality in the sense of 
Granger (1969). This one-sided Granger causality test is chosen from a number of 
alternative causality techniques in the light of the Monte Carlo evidence reported by 
Geweke, Meese, and Dent (1983).
9   
To be consistent with the ARDL tests, we also break the periods into pre-and 
post-crisis periods, and consider only the significant variables posted in Table 5a-7b. 
Furthermore, since the Granger test is narrowly interpreted here as a test for statistical 
exogeneity of particular variables within a given model, it seemed more prudent to 
maintain the same lag specifications as in the early results shown in Table 5a-7b when 
applying the Granger test.
10  For the sake of brevity, we will not report the test results.
11 
However, we can confidently conclude that the implicit assumption of exogeneity for the 
                                                           
9  The same procedure was also employed by Darrat and Arize (1990). 
 
10  We experimented with different lag structures and consistent overall results were obtained. 
 
11 The results can be made available upon any request to the authors.   13
explanatory variables is generally found to be applicable in our cases, except for the 
post-crisis domestic interest rate for the case of Indonesia. 
 
3.3.5 Stability Test 
  In addition to exogeneity test, we also conduct the commonly used Chow-stability 
test (Chow, 1960) and the CUSUM test to evaluate the stability of each regression. 
Following Farley, Huinich, and McGuire (1975), we split the observation sets at its 
midpoint to maximize the empirical power of the test of the Chow test. In general, our 
test results confirm that our estimated equations are structurally stable. For the sake of 
brevity, we do not report the test results. But the results can be made available upon 
request.   
 
3.4 Variance Decomposition 
  In addition to the ARDL models, we formulate the vector autoregressive models 
(VAR) to further evaluate the variability in inflation rates by the means of key explanatory 
variables, particularly expected depreciations of the local currency and the money 
supply.  In each of the variance decomposition test, we only include the significant 
explanatory variables reported in each ARDL test. The objective here is to estimate 
further the explanatory powers of the significant independent variables listed in Table 5a-
7b. The results are posted in Table 8a-10b.
12 
 
---- (Insert Table 8a-10b) ---- 
                                                           
12 We have also estimated the variance decompositions for the various ordering of the variables, 
as the variance decomposition is sensitive to the causal ordering and Cholesky decomposition. 
We found that the general findings are the same. We have also adopted the impulse response 
and the generalized impulse response techniques for the robustness. Again the general 
conclusions are the same. For the sake of brevity, the results are not reported here and it can be 
made available from authors upon request.   14
  Several key findings ought to be underlined. The shares of the explanatory 
variables, in particular growth rates of the money supply and the expected depreciation 
factor, in explaining the variances in the domestic inflation are very modest during the 
pre-1997 crisis for all three countries in general. With the exception for the quarterly 
case for Korea, where the variance of the money supply contributed as much as over 10 
percent of the overall variation of the inflation rate, the statistics show that at least 80 
percent of the variances of the inflation in these three economies can be explained by its 
own shocks. These findings are indeed consistent with the generally low-R squares 
reported in Table 5a-7b on the pre-crisis regressions.  
  In contrast to the mostly comparable results for the pre-crisis, there are both 
important similarities and contrasting evidences can be uncovered for the post-crisis 
results. Consistent with the sharp rise in the R-squares of the ARDL tests, the combined 
variances of the explanatory variables have contributed significantly in capturing the 
variance of the inflation rates for these three economies during the post-crisis. However 
the magnitudes are different. In one end, the explanatory variables, particularly the 
combination of the growth rate of the base money and the expected depreciation factor, 
have contributed between 10 percent to 26 percent of the variation in the domestic 
inflation rate in Thailand and Korea, respectively. While in Indonesia, close to 50 percent 
of the variation of the inflation rate can be explained by the shocks coming from the 
exchange rate and the base money factors.  
  Moreover, the test results also indicate that the role of money supply is indeed 
by far the most significant one for the Indonesian case, contributing as much as 37 
percent of the variation in the inflation rate. As for the rupiah exchange rate, we find the 
contribution to be around 11 percent, the second largest factor in explaining the 
variations of the inflation rate. In Thailand and Korea, the role of exchange rate variable 
clearly dominates, contributing between 9 percent to 23 percent of the variation in the   15
inflation rate. The test results also show that despite the significant coefficient estimates 
for the base money, the contribution of the variation of the growth rates of the monetary 
aggregates in explaining the variation of the inflation rate is in general found to be less 
than 2 percent, even smaller than that of the contribution of the variation in the domestic 
interest rate, except for the case of the bilateral nominal exchange rate of Thai baht.  
 
4. Stylized Facts  
  Preceding findings have suggested that while the loose management of the 
base money in Indonesia has been the primary cause of high and persistent inflation, the 
volatility of the local currency contributes the most to the price changes in Thailand and 
Korea during the post-1997 crisis. Next, we will look into few stylized facts to confirm the 
validity of our empirics. 
 
4.1 Volatility of Rupiah, Baht and Won 
Like most of the East Asian economies in 1990s, Indonesia, Thailand and Korea 
have actively intervened its foreign exchange market to manage the fluctuations of the 
local currencies, particularly against the US dollar (Frankel and Wei (1994), Hernandez 
and Montiel (2001) and McKinnon (2001)). From 1990 to the break of the financial crisis 
in 1997, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand had adopted crawling-peg, tightly managed 
floating and conventional fixed peg to basket, respectively (Bubula and Otket-Robe 
(2002)).  The daily exchange rate bands for Korean won against the US dollar were set 
between  2 . 0 ±  percent to  25 . 2 ±  percent from 1990 to 1996 (IMF (2000)). Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000a) find the probabilities that the monthly percentage change of nominal 
exchange rates of Indonesian rupiah and Thailand bath against the US dollar fall within 
1 ±  percent band and  5 . 2 ± percent band were in average above 96 percent and 93 
percent, respectively.    16
Illustrating further the rigidity of the pre-1997 exchange rate regime, the nominal 
exchange rate against the US dollar of the Indonesian rupiah and the Korean won had 
steadily depreciated by an annual average of 2 percent and 4 percent from January 
1990 to December 1996 (Figure 1 and 3). Thai bath, on the other hand, had modestly 
appreciated by an average of 0.18 percent per annum for the same pre-crisis period 
(Figure 2). Opposite trends were however reported from the nominal effective exchange 
rate (NEER).  From January 1990 to 1996, the nominal effective exchange rates of 
rupiah and won had appreciated on year on year basis by an average of 4 percent and 2 
percent, respectively.  Baht’s NEER on the other hand had depreciated by around 0.8 
percent year on year during the same pre-crisis period.  Despite the opposite trends, 
both fluctuations of the NEER and the bilateral nominal exchange rate reflect the stability 
of the three currencies during the pre-crisis. 
The financial crisis of 1997 however has brought about an unprecedented 
increase in the market uncertainties for most of the East Asian currencies. By the end of 
June 1998, the rupiah, the baht and the won have depreciated against the US dollar by 
around 400 percent, 35 percent and 38 percent from the June 1997 rate, respectively. 
Unlike the pre-crisis experiences, the post-crisis nominal effective exchange rates move 
closely with the bilateral nominal rates of each local currency against the US dollar, 
although the magnitudes of depreciation for the NEER were respectably smaller than 
those of the bilateral nominal against the US dollar (Figure 1 – 3).  The adoption of a 
more flexible regime of exchange rate, as recommended in the IMF reform package to 
each of these economies, has arguably responsible for the post-crisis co-movements 
between the NEER and the bilateral nominal exchange rate.  
To compare and contrast further the volatility of the three East Asian currencies 
during the pre-and post-crisis period, we employ different types of ARCH models. The   17
data sets include the observations from January 1985 to December 2001. The GARCH 
specification that we consider takes the form: 
  t t t t e dummy a NER a a NER + + + = − 2 1 1 0 ln ln , where  ) , 0 ( ~ t t h N e    (14)  
  t t t t t u dummy h e h + + + + = − − δ γ β α 1
2
1 .        (14b) 













NER represents the nominal effective exchange rate and the bilateral nominal 
exchanges rate of rupiah, bath and won against the US dollar. The conditional variance 
equation (Eq.14b) described above is a function of three terms: (1) the mean α ; (2) 
news about volatility from the previous period, measured as the lag of the squared 
residual from the mean equation: 
2
1 − t e  (the ARCH term); and (3) the last periods forecast 
error variance,  1 − t h  (the GARCH term). In addition, we add the dummy variable to 
capture the crisis period and the shift in the exchange rate policy. The dummy equals to 
zero up to July 1997, and equals to one from August 1997 to December 2001.  Different 
types of ARCH models such as ARCH, GARCH and EGARCH models were estimated 
on the data. The best results are posted in Table 11.  
 
--- Insert Table 11--- 
 
The test results demonstrate a substantial rise in the volatility rates of the 
three East Asian currencies. The means of conditional variances for the nominal 
bilateral nominal exchange rate against the US dollar of the rupiah, the baht and 
the won during the post-1997 are around 4 to 32 times higher than the pre-crisis 
levels, with the Thai baht and the Korean won experienced the lowest and the 
highest increase in volatilities, respectively. As for the NEER, the conditional   18
variance for Thailand has also reported the smallest jump in the volatility rate. In 
contrast, the rupiah experienced the most severe leap in its volatilities.      
It is also important to note here that the coefficients for dummy in all 
cases are positive and significant. The positive coefficients partly imply that the 
adoption of less rigid exchange rate policy allowed the local currencies to be 
more volatiles against the world currencies, particularly at the height of the crisis 
in 1998. Combining all relevant empirical results posted in section 3 and Table 
11, we can confidently argue that the rise in volatilities of the local currencies has 
strong inflationary consequences in three Asian economies.
13  
 
4.2 Base Money in Korea, Thailand and Indonesia 
4.2.1 Indonesia 
In October 31, 1997 the government of Indonesia had signed its first post-crisis 
policy agreement, which restricted the expansion of base money in the nine-months 
starting from the end of September 1997 to only 7.7 percent. The day after the first IMF 
agreement was signed, the government of Indonesia announced the liquidation of 16 
banks. Although the decision had already been foreshadowed, it created shock waves 
that resulted in a total loss of confidence in the banking system.  Within a month after the 
announcement of the closures of the 16 banks, the level of base money has grown by 
more than 36 percent, largely due to Bank Indonesia Liquidity Supports to troubled 
banks and to lessen the impacts of depositor runs on banks.  Figure 4 shows that by the 
end of July 1998, the base money had experienced an unprecedented increase of more 
                                                           
13 This finding provides a supporting evidence for the “fear of floating” phenomena in the 
emerging and newly developed economies posted by Calvo and Reinhart (2000a and 
2000b). 
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than 115% from its level in November 1997.
14  By September 2001, the volume of base 
money in the domestic economy continued to be well in excess of the targeted level set 
by the IMF Letter of Intent by about Rp 5 trillion (Siregar (2001)). 
 
4.2.2 Thailand    
  In sharp contrast to the Indonesian situation, Thailand announced tight limits on 
the monetary growth over the period of up to 12 months at the initial stages of their 
financial crisis and successfully met the targets. Resembling the LOI between the 
Indonesian government and the IMF, the Memorandum on Economic Policies signed by 
the government of Thailand and the IMF in August 1997 had envisaged an expansion of 
base money at around 8-10 percent for the next twelve months.
15 Thailand had also 
agreed and followed thru with the closure of more than 40 nearly insolvent financial firms 
that the government initially wanted to bail out, hence prevented excess liquidity in the 
domestic economy as experienced by Indonesia.   
By December 1997, the level of base money in Thailand was targeted by the IMF 
Letter of Intents of August 14, 1997 to rise moderately to around 489 billion bath from 
the level of 455 billion bath in September 1997. The actual amount of reserve money, 
however, was reported to increase only to around 477 billion by December 1997. 
Furthermore, instead of expanding the base money to 499 billion baht by the end of 
March 1998 as forecasted by August 1997 LOI, the base money had contracted and 
reached the level of 448 billion baht by the end of the first quarter of 1998.   
                                                           
14 For the sake of comparison, between 1991 and 1996, the annual growth rate of base money in 
Indonesia had been averaging only around 25%, with the highest growth in 1996 at 38% and the 
lowest in 1991 at around 15%.  Fane and McLeod (1999) argue that the margin by which the 
base money target for the early part of 1998 was missed so wide that any anti-inflationary effects 
of the earlier monetary contraction were more than undone. 
 
15  Refer to Thailand Letter of Intent, August 14, 1997 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/081497.htm). 
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4.2.3 Korea 
  In late 1997, nearly one-third of South Korea’s 30 chaebols failed or sought 
bankruptcy protection.  In mid-December 1997, the Bank of Korea injected liquidity to the 
banking sector of about W 8 trillion or more than one-third of reserve money at end-
November 1997. However, in contrast to the Indonesian case, the authorities quickly 
sterilized this large injection.
16  Rather than committing more fund to bail out the 
insolvent banks and chaebols, under the IMF deal brokered with South Korea in 
December 1997, foreign banks will be able to buy or merge with Korea’s domestic banks 
and foreign corporations will be able to increase their stake in Korean firms to 55 percent 
from the previously allowed 26 percent. 
As in the case of Thailand, the Korean monetary authority had also successfully 
followed thru with its tight monetary policy. The level of base money declined by more 
than 11 percent by December of 1998 from its level reported at the last month of 1997. 
By the end of first quarter 1998, Korea met base money target set by the IMF Letter of 
Intent of December 1997. In April 1, 1998, only about three months after the break of the 
financial crisis in the country, the newly revised Bank of Korea Act came into effect and 
clearly spells out that price stability is the primary goal of the monetary policy.  
  To summarize the contrasting experiences of these three economies, from 
December 1997 to December 1998, Indonesia had expanded (year on year) its monthly 
base money by an average of about 75 percent. For the same twelve months period, 
Thailand and Korea, on the other hand, had successfully tightened their monetary policy 
and reported a monthly average of “year on year” contraction of base money at around 
0.35 percent and 7 percent, respectively. Consistent with these stylized facts, our test 
results have found that the rapid expansion of base money had eventually played the   21
most significant role in generating post-crisis fierce inflationary pressure in Indonesia 
during the recent years. As for Korea and Thailand, the weak and volatile local 
currencies contributed significantly more to the price fluctuations than the base money. 
    
5. Brief Concluding Remarks 
Inflation rate of these three economies, while it initially exceeded the target sets 
by the IMF recovery programs, at least in Korea and Thailand turned out closer to target 
than would have been expected (Lane et.al (1999)). Korea had in fact kept its rates of 
inflation below the targeted rate set by the Letter of Intent starting 1999. In contrast, 
Indonesia’s program had gone off track and inflation rate raised well above the expected 
rate.    
Our simple but an intuitive monetary model successfully unveils a number of 
contrasting evidences on the post-crisis inflations.  The contribution of base money in 
generating inflationary pressures was generally moderate in the case of Thailand and 
Korea.  The empirical results conclusively suggest that the uncertainty with the local 
currencies was significantly a more dominant factor than the base money in explaining 
higher inflation rates in those two economies. For Indonesia, while both the growth rate 
of base money and the weak rupiah have indeed been found to be significant 
contributors to the rapid rise in the price level during the post-1997 period. The base 
money factor was, however, by far the most dominant contributor.  
This leads us to conclude that the Latin American style of inflation that was 
reported in Indonesia during the recent crisis was clearly associated with the excess 
liquidity due to substantial supports provided to troubled banks. In contrast, despite the 
adverse consequences of the weak and volatile local currencies, more successful efforts 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 To ease domestic liquidity constraint, the government of Korea eliminated all restrictions of 
foreign investment in domestic bond and also the aggregate ceiling on foreign portfolio   22
by the monetary authorities in Thailand and Korea in managing the growths of the 
monetary aggregate had prevented the economies from experiencing pro-longed double 
digits rates of inflation in recent years.   
With the adoption of a less rigid exchange rate policy, the monetary policy of 
Indonesia, Thailand and Korea have moved toward an inflation-targeting framework 
starting as early as 1998. At the initial stage, a series of practical issues must be 
resolved such as: (1) defining the price index that will be targeted and (2) estimating the 
level of inflation consistent with the objectives of the rest of the macroeconomics 
policies. As for the future, one lesson ought to be learnt from the recent crisis is that a 
transparent and credible management of the monetary aggregates is an essential 




                                                                                                                                                                             
investment was lifted in 1998.     23
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Table 1 
Inflation Rates During The Financial Crisis of 1990s and 2000s 
 
 
Country  Year  Annual Inflation Rate
a  

























   




   
Argentina 2002
b 30% 






Source: World Economic Outlook, September 2002, IMF. 
a/ Based on consumer price index. 
b/ The rate for the first six months of 2002, IMF Survey, Vol.31, No. 15, August 2002.   27
Table 2: Unit Root Test Results for Indonesia (January 1987 – June 1997) 
(Pre-crisis period (Monthly Data Base)) 
 
 ADF  statistics  PP test  KPSS    
Series  Test 
statistic 
Lags Test statistic Lags  Test statistic Lags Test type  Order of 
integration
Level  -3.02 1  -2.82  4  0.24*** 4 trend  &  drift 
p  First 
difference 
-6.67*** 3  -9.58***  4  0.06 




























0.15  4 With  drift  I(0) 
Level  -1.63 1  -2.01  4  0.58** 4   with drift  
r  First 
difference 
-8.78*** 1  -14.57***  4  0.09 
4 no  drift 
I(1) 
Level  -2.12 8  -1.30  4  1.07*** 4 with  drift 
rf  First 
difference 
-7.91*** 0  -7.99***  4  0.21 
4 no  drift 
I(1) 
Level  -1.16 2  -2.26  4  0.57*** 4 trend  &  drift 
m0  First 
difference 
-11.78*** 1  -19.58***  4  0.34 
4 with  drift 
I(1) 
 
Note: a). ***, ** and * represents the rejection of null at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; 
b). Lag lengths for the ADF test regression is choosen such that Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or the 
Schwarz Criteria (SC) is minimized; c). Truncation lag to evaluate the serial correlation for the Newey-West 
correction for both PP and KPSS test is computed by  ) ) 100 / ( 4 (
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Table 2 (cont’d): Unit Root Test Results for Indonesia (July 1997 – December 2001) 
(Post-crisis period (Monthly Data Base)) 
 ADF  statistics  PP test  KPSS    
Series  Test 
statistic 
Lags Test statistic Lags  Test statistic Lags Test type  Order of 
integration
Level  -3.02 1  -2.82  4  2.23*** 4 trend  &  drift 
p  First 
difference 
-6.67*** 3  -9.58***  4  0.34 
4 with  drift 
I(1) 
ed1 











0.25  4  with  drift  I(0) 











4 With  drift  I(0) 
Level  -1.63 1  -2.01  4  0.62** 4   with drift  
r  First 
difference 
-8.78*** 1  -14.57***  4  0.20 
4 no  drift 
I(1) 
Level  -2.12 8  -1.30  4  0.39*  3 with  drift 
rf  First 
difference 
-7.91*** 0  -7.99***  4  0.24 
4 no  drift 
I(1) 
Level  -1.16 2  -2.26  4  0.19** 4 trend  &  drift 
m0  First 
difference 
-11.78*** 1  -19.58***  4  0.13 
4 with  drift 
I(1) 
Note: a). ***, ** and * represents the rejection of null at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; 
b). Lag lengths for the ADF test regression is choosen such that Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or the 
Schwarz Criteria (SC) is minimized; c). Truncation lag to evaluate the serial correlation for the Newey-West 
correction for both PP and KPSS test is computed by  ) ) 100 / ( 4 (
9 / 2 T floor q = . 
 
Table 2: Unit Root Test Results for Indonesia (cont’d): 
Unit Root Test Results: Quarter 1, 1987 – Quarter 1, 1997 (Pre-crisis period) 
 ADF  statistics  PP test  KPSS    
Series  Test 
statistic 
Lags Test statistic Lags  Test statistic Lags Test type  Order of 
integration
Level  -2.31 1  -2.79  3  0.15  2  With  drift 
y  First 
difference 




Note: a). ***, ** and * represents the rejection of null at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively;  b). Lag lengths for the ADF test regression is choosen such that Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) or the Schwarz Criteria (SC) is minimized; c). Truncation lag to evaluate the serial 
correlation for the Newey-West correction for both PP and KPSS test is computed by 
) ) 100 / ( 4 (
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Table 3: Unit Root Test Results for Thailand (January 1987 – June 1997) 
(Pre-crisis period (Monthly Data Base)) 
 ADF  statistics  PP test  KPSS    
Series  Test 
statistic 
Lags Test statistic Lags  Test statistic Lags Test type  Order of 
integration
Level  -2.69 3  -2.25  4  0.35*** 4 trend  &  drift 
p  First 
difference 
-6.58*** 3  -10.24***  4  0.29 




























0.26  4 With  drift  I(0) 
Level  -1.78 1  -1.87  4  0.58*** 4   with drift  
r  First 
difference 
-12.08*** 0 -12.11***  4  0.05 
4 no  drift 
I(1) 
Level  -1.52 3  -1.36  4  1.29*** 4 with  drift 
rf  First 
difference 
-8.37*** 0  -8.42***  4  0.17 
4 no  drift 
I(1) 
Level  -3.37* 7  -3.49*  4  0.26*** 4 trend  &  drift 
m0  First 
difference 
-9.78*** 2  -25.53***  4  0.10 
4 with  drift 
I(1) 
 
Note: a). ***, ** and * represents the rejection of null at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; 
b). Lag lengths for the ADF test regression is choosen such that Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or the 
Schwarz Criteria (SC) is minimized; c). Truncation lag to evaluate the serial correlation for the Newey-West 
correction for both PP and KPSS test is computed by  ) ) 100 / ( 4 (
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Table 3 (cont’d): Unit Root Test Results for Thailand  (July 1997 – December 2001) 
(Post-crisis period (Monthly Data Base)) 
 ADF  statistics  PP test  KPSS    
Series  Test 
statistic 
Lags Test statistic Lags  Test statistic Lags Test type  Order of 
integration
Level  -2.84 6  -2.52  3  0.19** 3  trend & drift 
p  First 
difference 



















with  drift  I(0) 












3  With drift  I(0) 
Level  -1.61 0  -1.57  3  0.83*** 3   with drift  
r  First 
difference 
-8.66*** 0  -8.64***  3  0.30 3 
no drift 
I(1) 
Level  -0.21 1  1.07  3  0.74*** 3  with drift 
rf  First 
difference 
-2.63*** 1  -2.88***  3  0.33 3 
no drift 
I(1) 
Level  -2.76 5  -2.40  3  0.27*** 3  trend & drift 
m0  First 
difference 




Note: a). ***, ** and * represents the rejection of null at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; 
b). Lag lengths for the ADF test regression is choosen such that Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or the 
Schwarz Criteria (SC) is minimized; c). Truncation lag to evaluate the serial correlation for the Newey-West 
correction for both PP and KPSS test is computed by  ) ) 100 / ( 4 (
9 / 2 T floor q = . 
 
 
Table 3: Unit Root Results for Thailand (cont’d) 
Unit Root Test Results: Quarter 1, 1985 – Quarter 1, 1997 (Pre-crisis period) 
 ADF  statistics  PP test  KPSS    
Series  Test 
statistic 
Lags Test statistic Lags  Test statistic Lags Test type  Order of 
integration
Level  -1.42 0  -1.44  3  1.29*** 3  With  drift 
y  First 
difference 




Note: a). ***, ** and * represents the rejection of null at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; 
b). Lag lengths for the ADF test regression is choosen such that Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or the 
Schwarz Criteria (SC) is minimized; c). Truncation lag to evaluate the serial correlation for the Newey-West 
correction for both PP and KPSS test is computed by  ) ) 100 / ( 4 (
9 / 2 T floor q = . 
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Table 4: Unit Root Test Results for Korea (January 1985 – June 1997) 
(Pre-crisis period (Monthly Data Base)) 
 
 ADF  statistics  PP test  KPSS    
Series  Test 
statistic 
Lags Test statistic Lags  Test statistic Lags Test type  Order of 
integration
Level  -0.40 2  -0.38  4  3.09*** 4  trend & drift 
p  First 
difference 







-4.11*** 2  -7.15***  4  0.34  4 




-6.44*** 1  -9.45***  4  0.34  4 
With drift  I(0) 
Level  -1.89 4  -2.48  4  1.21*** 4   with drift  
r  First 
difference 
-12.42*** 4 -12.65***  4  0.09  4 
no drift 
I(1) 
Level  -1.52 3  -1.36  4  1.29*** 4  with drift 
rf  First 
difference 
-8.37*** 0  -8.42***  4  0.17  4 
no drift 
I(1) 
Level  -2.59 3  -0.55  4  3.07*** 4  trend & drift 
m0  First 
difference 




Note: a). ***, ** and * represents the rejection of null at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively; b). Lag lengths for the ADF test regression is choosen such that Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) or the Schwarz Criteria (SC) is minimized; c). Truncation lag to evaluate the serial 
correlation for the Newey-West correction for both PP and KPSS test is computed by 
) ) 100 / ( 4 (
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Table 4 (cont’d): Unit Root Test Results for Korea (July 1997 – March 2002) 
(Post-crisis period (Monthly Data Base)) 
 ADF  statistics  PP test  KPSS    
Series  Test 
statistic 
Lags Test statistic Lags  Test statistic Lags Test type  Order of 
integration
Level  -2.82 2  -2.61  3  1.39*** 3  trend & drift 
p  First 
difference 




(against  US$) 
Level 
-6.85*** 0  -6.85***  3  0.12  3 
with  drift  I(0) 
ed2 (neer)  Level  -4.49*** 1  -6.42***  3  0.13  3  With drift  I(0) 
Level  -1.40 3  -0.97  3  1.05*** 3   with drift  
r  First 
difference 
-3.78*** 0 -3.81***  3  0.10  3 
no drift 
I(1) 
Level  -0.21 1  1.07  3  0.64*** 3  with drift 
rf  First 
difference 
-2.63*** 1  -2.88***  3  0.37*  3 
no drift 
I(1) 
Level  -2.21 2  -2.40  3  1.25*** 3  trend & drift 
m0  First 
difference 
-7.87*** 1  -12.38***  3  0.21  3 
with drift 
I(1) 
Note: a). ***, ** and * represents the rejection of null at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; 
b). Lag lengths for the ADF test regression is choosen such that Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or the 
Schwarz Criteria (SC) is minimized; c). Truncation lag to evaluate the serial correlation for the Newey-West 
correction for both PP and KPSS test is computed by  ) ) 100 / ( 4 (
9 / 2 T floor q = . 
 
 
Table 4: Unit Roots for Korea (cont’d) 
Unit Root Test Results: Quarter 1, 1985 – Quarter 1, 1997 (Pre-crisis period) 
 
 ADF  statistics  PP test  KPSS    
Series  Test 
statistic 
Lags Test statistic Lags  Test statistic Lags Test type  Order of 
integration
Level  -2.73 2  -2.38  3  0.77*** 3  With  drift 
y  First 
difference 




Note: a). ***, ** and * represents the rejection of null at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; 
b). Lag lengths for the ADF test regression is choosen such that Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or the 
Schwarz Criteria (SC) is minimized; c). Truncation lag to evaluate the serial correlation for the Newey-West 
correction for both PP and KPSS test is computed by  ) ) 100 / ( 4 (
9 / 2 T floor q = .  
   
 
Table 5a: ARDL Results for Indonesia  
(With the expected depreciation of bilateral nominal exchange rate of Indonesian rupiah against the US$)  
 
1). ARDL Results : Quarter 1, 1987 – Quarter 1, 1997 (Pre-crisis) 
 
   * * * (0.004)    * * * (0.003)       * * ) 079 . 0 ( * * * ) 006 . 0 (        * * ) 120 . 0 (    
021 . 0 009 . 0 204 . 0 051 . 0 297 . 0 4 4 3 2 + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ − = ∆ − − − −
s
t t t t t M y ed p p
 
R-squared= 0.27, DW=2.09; F-stat=3.32; Prob (F-stat) = 0.020; ARCH (Prob) = 0.87, Prob(Q(4))=0.91; Prob(Q(8))=0.99; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.78; Prob(Q(16))=0.71; Prob(JB)=0.16 
 
2). ARDL Results : January 1987 - June 1997 (Pre--crisis) 
   * * * (0.001)         * (0.009)      * * * (0.083)      * * ) 087 . 0 ( * * ) 088 . 0 (         * * ) 087 . 0 (
007 . 0 016 . 0 278 . 0 206 . 0 218 . 0 227 . 0 2 4 3 2 1 + ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − − − − −
s
t t t t t t M p p p p p
 
R-squared= 0.17, DW=2.00; F-stat=4.62; Prob(F-stat) = 0.001; ARCH (Prob) = 0.84; Prob(Q(4))=0.98; Prob(Q(8))=0.87; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.21; Prob(Q(16))=0.34; Prob(JB)=0.10 
 
3). ARDL Results : July 1997 - December 2001 (Post-crisis) 
               (0.064)***           (0.017)**         (0.017)***         (0.019)***           (0.020)***         (0.009)***  
 
R-squared= 0.85, DW=2.16; F-stat=51.79; Prob(F-stat) = 0.000; ARCH (Prob) = 0.118; ARCH (Prob) = 0.86; Prob(Q(4))=0.94; 
Prob(Q(8))=0.97; Prob(Q(12))=0.79; Prob(Q(16))=0.72; Prob(JB)=0.38 
Note: (  ) is standard error; * Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%; DW= Durbin-
Watson; Q = the Ljung-Box Q autocorrelation test.; JB=Jarque-Bera Normality test statistic. 
 
 
Table 5b: ARDL Results for Indonesia 
(With the expected depreciation of nominal effective exchange rate of Indonesian rupiah) 
 
1). ARDL Results : Quarter 1, 1987 – Quarter 1, 1997 (Pre-crisis) 
                   (0.13)**      (0.09)**     (0.007)***    (0.04)*      (0.003)***       
R-squared= 0.34, DW=2.09; F-stat=4.74; Prob(F-stat) = 0.003; ARCH (Prob) = 0.63; Prob(Q(4))=0.81; Prob(Q(8))=0.87; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.68; Prob(Q(16))=0.61; Prob(JB)=0.15 
 
2). ARDL Results : January 1987 - June 1997 (Pre--crisis) 
   * * * (0.001)         * (0.009)      * * * (0.083)      * * ) 087 . 0 ( * * ) 088 . 0 (         * * ) 087 . 0 (
007 . 0 016 . 0 278 . 0 206 . 0 218 . 0 227 . 0 2 4 3 2 1 + ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − − − − −
s
t t t t t t M p p p p p
 
R-squared= 0.17, DW=2.00; F-stat=4.62; Prob(F-stat) = 0.001; ARCH (Prob) = 0.84; Prob(Q(4))=0.98; Prob(Q(8))=0.87; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.21 Prob(Q(16))=0.34Prob(JB)=0.10 
 
3). ARDL Results : July 1997 - December 2001 (Post-crisis) 
       
            (0.064)***    (0.017)**     (0.017)***    (0.019)***      (0.021)***     (0.009)***  
 
R-squared= 0.85, DW=2.14; F-stat=51.69; Prob(F-stat) = 0.000; ARCH (Prob) = 0.118; ARCH (Prob) = 0.84; 
Prob(Q(4))=0.90; Prob(Q(8))=0.92; Prob(Q(12))=0.76; Prob(Q(16))=0.70; Prob(JB)=0.36 
Note: (  ) is standard error; * Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%; DW= Durbin-
Watson; Q = the Ljung-Box Q autocorrelation test.; JB=Jarque-Bera Normality test statistic.
∆∆ ∆ pp yM e d tt t t
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t =− + + + + −− − 035 022 002 007 002 24 1 .. . . .
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Table 6a: ARDL Results for Thailand 
(With the expected depreciation of bilateral nominal exchange rate of Baht against the US dollar) 
1). ARDL Results : Quarter 1, 1985 – Quarter 1, 1997 (Pre-crisis) 
  (0.001)       * * * (0.01)   * * (0.01)   * * * (0.002)       * * * (0.02)            * (0.02)        * * ) 06 . 0 ( * * ) 07 . 0 (     * * * ) 09 . 0 (




t t t t t rf rf r M M y ed p p
 
R-squared= 0.54, DW=2.38; F-stat=5.27; Prob(F-stat) = 0.000; ARCH (Prob) = 0.31; Prob(Q(4))=0.46; Prob(Q(8))=0.69; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.61; Prob(Q(16))=0.72; Prob(JB)=0.72 
2). ARDL Results : January 1985 – June 1997 (Pre-crisis) 
  * * * (0.001)         * (0.008)    * * * (0.001)          * (0.001)     * * * ) 05 . 0 ( * * * ) 078 . 0 (     * * ) 087 . 0 (
004 . 0 02 . 0 003 . 0 002 . 0 12 . 0 25 . 0 19 . 0 2 4 1 1 2 1 + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − − − − − −
s
t t t t t t t M r r ed p p p
 
R-squared= 0.17, DW=1.92; F-stat=4.820; Prob(F-stat) = 0.0001; ARCH (Prob) = 0.73; Prob(Q(4))=0.50; Prob(Q(8))=0.71; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.22; Prob(Q(16))=0.23; Prob(JB)=0.77 
3). ARDL Results : July 1997 - May 2002 (Post-crisis) 
           (0.13)**      (0.02)**   (0.002)**    (0.006)**        (0.01)**    (0.0005)***          
 
R-squared= 0.45, DW=2.02; F-stat=8.53; Prob(F-stat) = 0.000; ARCH (Prob) = 0.63; Prob(Q(4))=0.37; Prob(Q(8))=0.27; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.44; Prob(Q(16))=0.65; Prob(JB)=0.38 
Note: (  ) is standard error; * Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%; DW= Durbin-
Watson; Q = the Ljung-Box Q autocorrelation test.; JB=Jarque-Bera Normality test statistic. 
 
 
Table 6b: ARDL Results for Thailand 
(With the expected depreciation of nominal effective exchange rate of baht) 
 
1). ARDL Results : Quarter 1, 1985 – Quarter 1, 1997 (Pre-crisis) 
                   (0.065)***  (0.06)***    (0.026)**       (0.003)**     (0.006)***       (0.02)***         (0.001)      
               
R-squared= 0.49, DW=2.34; F-stat=6.20 ; Prob(F-stat) = 0.0001; ARCH (Prob) = 0.50;  Prob(Q(4))=0.69; Prob(Q(8))=0.26; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.25; Prob(Q(16))=0.17; Prob(JB)=0.48 
 
2). ARDL Results : January 1985 - June 1997 (Pre-crisis) 
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − − − − − − − t t t t t t t t t rf r r r ed ed p p p 02 . 0 003 . 0 003 . 0 003 . 0 04 . 0 05 . 0 29 . 0 22 . 0 4 3 1 3 1 2 1  
           (0.07)***        (0.07)***         (0.26)**            (0.23)*              (0.002)*         (0.001)**          (0.001)**         (0.009)**        






t M M M  
               (0.016)**             (0.016)**        (0.016)*            (0.0006)*** 
R-squared= 0.23, DW=2.02; F-stat=3.69; Prob(F-stat) = 0.0001; ARCH (Prob) = 0.49;  Prob(Q(4))=0.80; Prob(Q(8))=0.59; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.21; Prob(Q(16))=0.29; Prob(JB)=0.30 
 
3). ARDL Results : July 1997 - December 2001 (Post-crisis) 
001 . 0 03 . 0 007 . 0 015 . 0 035 . 0 268 . 0 2 2 3 1 + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − − − −
s
t t t t t t M r ed ed p p        
           (0.123)**    (0.015)**       (0.009)***    (0.003)***      (0.014)**        (0.0005)***  
 
R-squared= 0.45, DW=2.02; F-stat=8.62; Prob(F-stat) = 0.000; ARCH (Prob) = 0.67; Prob(Q(4))=0.25; Prob(Q(8))=0.13; 
Prob(Q(12))=0.20; Prob(Q(16))=0.41; Prob(JB)=0.25 
Note: (  ) is standard error; * Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%; DW= Durbin-
Watson; Q = the Ljung-Box Q autocorrelation test.; JB=Jarque-Bera Normality test statistic. 
002 . 0 03 . 0 011 . 0 01 . 0 03 . 0 31 . 0 2 2 2 1 + + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ = ∆ − − − −
s
t t t t t t M rf r ed p p
002 . 0 067 . 0 019 . 0 005 . 0 057 . 0 16 . 0 34 . 0 3 3 4 1 3 4 + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − − − − − −
s






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































pTable 8a: Variance Decomposition of  p ∆ for Indonesia 
(With the expected depreciation of bilateral nominal exchange rate of rupiah against  the US dollar) 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Quarterly Data) 
Period  p ∆   ed 
   
1 100.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
4  96.63  0.15 0.33 2.89 
8  96.31  0.16 0.34 3.19 
12 96.31  0.16 0.34 3.19 
16 96.30  0.16 0.34 3.19 
20 96.30  0.16 0.34 3.19 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
Period  p ∆  
 
1 100.00  0.00 
4 96.71  3.29 
8 96.65  3.34 
12 96.65  3.35 
16 96.65  3.35 
20 96.65  3.35 
 
(Post-Crisis Period on Monthly Data 
Period  p ∆   ∆ m  ed  ∆r 
1 100.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
4  48.77 37.55 11.79  1.89 
8  48.52 37.33 11.27  2.88 
12  48.50 37.36 11.22  2.92 
16  48.50 37.36 11.22  2.92 





Table 8b: Variance Decomposition of  p ∆ for Indonesia 
(With the expected depreciation of nominal effective exchange rate of rupiah) 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Quarterly Data) 
 
Period  p ∆   ed 
   
1 100.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
4  96.30  0.32 1.55 1.83 
8  96.09  0.33 1.57 2.01 
12 96.08  0.33 1.57 2.01 
16 96.08  0.33 1.57 2.01 






   
Table 8b (cont’d): Variance Decomposition of  p ∆ for Indonesia 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
Period  p ∆  
 
1 100.00  0.00 
4 96.71  3.29 
8 96.65  3.34 
12 96.65  3.35 
16 96.65  3.35 
20 96.65  3.35 
 
(Post-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
Period  p ∆   ∆ m  ed  ∆r 
1 100.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
4  49.12 37.68 11.26  1.94 
8  48.87 37.46 10.79  2.88 
12  48.85 37.48 10.76  2.91 
16  48.85 37.48 10.75  2.91 




Table 9a: Variance Decomposition of  p ∆  for Thailand 
(With the expected depreciation of bilateral nominal exchange rate of baht against  the US dollar) 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Quarterly Data) 
 
Period  p ∆   ed  r ∆   rf ∆  
   
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
4 81.9  1.2  7.0  0.3  6.9  2.6 
8 81.8  1.2  7.0  0.3  7.0  2.6 
12 81.8  1.2  7.0  0.3  7.0 2.6 
16 81.8  1.2  7.0  0.3  7.0 2.6 
20 81.8  1.2  7.0  0.3  7.0 2.6 
 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
 
Period  p ∆   ed  r ∆  
 
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4 99.0  0.0  0.9  0.1 
8 99.0  0.0  0.9  0.1 
12 99.0  0.0  0.9  0.1 
16 99.0  0.0  0.9  0.1 







   
 
Table 9a (cont’d): Variance Decomposition of  p ∆  for Thailand 
 
(Post-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
Period  p ∆   ed  r ∆   rf ∆  
 
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4 80.9  15.1  0.3  2.7  1.0 
8 79.8  15.0  0.3  3.9  1.0 
12 79.7  15.0  0.3  4.0  1.0 
16 79.7  15.0  0.3  4.0  1.0 




Table 9b: Variance Decomposition of  p ∆ for Thailand 
(With the expected depreciation of nominal effective exchange rate of baht) 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Quarterly Data) 
Period  p ∆   ed  r ∆   rf ∆  
   
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
4 84.3  1.0  4.8  0.4  7.1  2.4 
8 84.2  1.0  4.8  0.4  7.1  2.4 
12 84.2  1.0  4.8  0.4  7.1 2.4 
16 84.2  1.0  4.8  0.4  7.1 2.4 
20 84.2  1.0  4.8  0.4  7.1 2.4 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
Period  p ∆   ed  r ∆   rf ∆  
 
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4 97.7  0.0  0.9  1.2  0.1 
8 97.7  0.0  0.9  1.2  0.1 
12 97.7  0.0  0.9  1.2  0.1 
16 97.7  0.0  0.9  1.2  0.1 
20 97.7  0.0  0.9  1.2  0.1 
 
(Post-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
Period  p ∆   ed  r ∆  
 
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4 87.7  8.4  2.7  1.1 
8 87.5  8.5  2.9  1.1 
12 87.5  8.5  2.9  1.1 
16 87.5  8.5  2.9  1.1 










   
 
Table 10a: Variance Decomposition of  p ∆ for Korea 
(With the expected depreciation of bilateral nominal exchange rate of Won against  the US dollar) 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Quarterly Data) 
Period  p ∆   r ∆   rf ∆  
   
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
4 78.9  1.3  4.1  13.9  1.7 
8 77.2  2.2  4.6  13.7  2.2 
12 77.2  2.2  4.6  13.7  2.2 
16 77.2  2.2  4.6  13.7  2.2 
20 77.2  2.2  4.6  13.7  2.2 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
Period  p ∆   r ∆   rf ∆  
 
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4 95.3  1.5  2.8  0.4 
8 91.3  2.1  3.5  3.1 
12 91.2  2.1  3.5  3.2 
16 91.2  2.1  3.5  3.2 
20 91.2  2.1  3.5  3.2 
 
(Post-Crisis Period on Monthly Data 
Period  p ∆   Ed  r ∆  
 
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4 73.9  21.6  2.8  1.7 
8 73.9  21.5  2.9  1.7 
12 73.9  21.5  2.9  1.7 
16 73.9  21.5  2.9  1.7 




Table 10b: Variance Decomposition of  p ∆ for Korea 
(With the expected depreciation of nominal effective exchange rate of won) 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Quarterly Data) 
Period  p ∆   r ∆   rf ∆  
   
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
4 78.9  1.3  4.1  13.9  1.7 
8 77.2  2.2  4.6  13.7  2.2 
12 77.2  2.2  4.6  13.7  2.2 
16 77.2  2.2  4.6  13.7  2.2 






   
Table 10b (cont’d): Variance Decomposition of  p ∆ for Korea 
 
(Pre-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
Period  p ∆   r ∆   rf ∆  
 
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4 95.3  1.5  2.8  0.4 
8 91.3  2.1  3.5  3.1 
12 91.2  2.1  3.5  3.2 
16 91.2  2.1  3.5  3.2 
20 91.2  2.1  3.5  3.2 
 
 
(Post-Crisis Period on Monthly Data) 
Period  p ∆   Ed  r ∆  
 
1 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
4 72.5  23.1  2.9  1.5 
8 72.5  23.1  2.9  1.6 
12 72.5  23.1  2.9  1.6 
16 72.5  23.1  2.9  1.6 




Table 11: GARCH (1,1) and ARCH(1)  
Volatility of Monthly Nominal Effective Exchange Rate and  Nominal Exchange Rates 
against US dollars  (January 1985-December 2001) 
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* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and ***significant at 1%; Numbers inside (  ) are the t-








   
 
 
Table 11: GARCH (1,1) and ARCH(1)  (cont’d) 
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* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and ***significant at 1%; Numbers inside (  ) are the t-
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* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and ***significant at 1%; Numbers inside (  ) are the t-
statistics. Pre-Crisis: January 1985 – June 1997; Post-Crisis: July 1997 – December 2001. 
 
  
   
 
Figure 1: (for Indonesia)  
Inflation , Growth Rate of Base Money and Change in Nominal Rupiah  
 





































   
Figure 1: (for Indonesia) cont’d: 













Figure 2: (for Thailand)  
Inflation, Growth Rate of Base Money and Change in Nominal Baht 
 

























   
Figure 2: (for Thailand) cont’d 
























Figure 3: (for Korea)  
Inflation, Growth Rate of Base Money and Change in Nominal Baht 
 













   
Figure 3: (for Korea) cont’d 
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